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1. introduction
We talk of globalization, of the global village, but here in Africa we are under the
impression of being that village’s septic tank.
– Haïdar el Ali, Senegalese former Minister of Ecology
The African Union (AU)1 adopted the Protocol on Amendments on the
Protocol on the Statute of African Court of Justice and Human Rights2
(hereinafter Malabo Protocol) to create the ﬁrst ever regional criminal tribu-
nal in June of 2014.3 The regional criminal tribunal criminalizes trafﬁcking in
I would like to thank Ifeoma Ajunwa, Rabia Belt, Kamari Clarke and the Pitt Law Junior
Faculty Forum for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Jacqueline
Jones for her research assistance. I take full responsibility for any errors. This book chapter was
adapted with permission. See Matiangai Sirleaf, Not Your Dumping Ground: Criminalization
of Trafﬁcking in Hazardous Waste in Africa, 35 Wisc. J. Int’l L. 326–66 (2018)
(symposium issue).
1 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lomé, 11 July 2000, in force 26May 2001, 2158 U.N.T.S.
I-37733 [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act]. For more on the transition from the Organization
of African Unity (OAU) to the AU see generally, Abou Jeng Peacebuilding in the African
Union: Law, Philosophy and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p. 111.
2 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, Malabo, 27 June 2014, available at http://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-
amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights.
3 See id., art. 16. The Assembly of the AU adopted the Malabo Protocol on 27 June 2014 at its
Twenty-Third Ordinary Session. See A.U. Doc. No. Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII). The
regional Court’s criminal law section will be composed of a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial
Chamber, and an Appellate Chamber. Malabo Protocol, supra note 3, art. 16(2). See also
Dinah L. Shelton & Paolo G. Carroza, Regional Protection of Human Rights, Second Edition
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 1019. In the book, this is characterized as
‘revolutionary’.
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hazardous waste,4 and presents an opportunity for African states to alter the
status quo in environmental protection. Trafﬁcking in hazardous waste is
something that none of the existing international criminal tribunals have
jurisdiction over.5 African states may be particularly sensitive to concerns
about toxic waste, given a history of negative external interventions.6 This
chapter argues that regional cooperation through the criminal tribunal might
assist with more effective prosecution of toxic dumping incidents. This is
especially so because the Malabo Protocol provides for corporate criminal
liability,7 which presents a signiﬁcant innovation for the ﬁeld of international
criminal justice.8
This chapter examines how the AU’s adoption of the Malabo Protocol seeks
to improve upon the limitations of the international legal framework for
regulating hazardous waste. Little to no scholarship exists on the Malabo
Protocol’s provision criminalizing trafﬁcking in hazardous waste. This chapter
illuminates an under-researched area and provides a robust analysis of the
criminalization of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste in Africa. This chapter
situates the Malabo Protocol’s provision criminalizing the trafﬁcking in
4 Malabo Protocol, supra note 3, art. 28L.
5 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1998, in force on 1 July
2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/Res/827 , available at www.icty.org/x/ﬁle/
Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/Res/955, available
at www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002), available at www.sc-sl
.org/LinkClick.aspx?ﬁleticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter SCSL Statute]; see
also generally S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc S/RES/1315 (14 August 2000)
on the establishment of the SCSL.
6 For further discussion, see Henry J. Richardson, ‘African Grievances and the International
Criminal Court: Issues of African Equity under International Criminal Law’ (2013), Africa and
the Future of International Criminal Justice 81 (V.O. Nmehielle ed., Eleven 2012); Temple
University Legal Study Research Paper No. 2013–24 available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2285474. Justice, 91 (Vincent Nmehielle ed., 2012) (discussing the continent’s history
with slavery, colonialism, and neo-colonialism).
7 Malabo Protocol, supra note 3, art. 46C. This chapter relies on the broad deﬁnition of
‘hazardous waste’ in the Bamako Convention on the ban on the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa,
Bamako, 30 January 1991, in force 22 April 1998 available at 30 I.L.M. 773, including wastes
from particular streams in manufacturing processes, or hazardous constituent materials, wastes
considered hazardous under the domestic laws of the country of export, import, or transit, as
well as wastes outlawed in the exporting country due to human health or environmental
reasons, and radioactive wastes. See id. art. 2, Annex I and Annex II of the Bamako
Convention.
8 None of the existing international criminal tribunals provide for corporate criminal liability.
Compare, Rome Statute, ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute and SCSL Statute supra note 6.
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hazardous waste as part of the larger environmental justice movement and
the struggle against corporate, government, and individual polluters. Environ-
mental justice is a contested term that has variously been deﬁned by scholars
as – signifying inequitable distribution, a lack of recognition, limited partici-
pation, a critical lack of capabilities, inequitable application of environmental
regulations, and systematic exclusion from environmental policies and deci-
sions amongst others.9 In the environmental justice literature, Robert Nixon
has coined the term “slow violence” to describe a violence of delayed destruc-
tion that is “dispersed throughout time and space” to disposable bodies.10 His
work draws attention to categories of violence that unfold over years and
decades that is often exponential and operates as a major threat multiplier,
in the same way that toxic dumping can.11 Such work complicates our
understanding of violence because it does not conceive of violence as spec-
tacular, or immediately sensational, or hyper-visible.12 The concept of slow
violence allows us to consider more forcefully the violence caused by environ-
mental harms like toxic dumping.
The dumping of toxic waste in the Global South, and particularly in
African countries is by no means an exceptional, or recent phenomenon.13
This chapter will demonstrate the problematic trend of ‘toxic colonialism,’ in
which African states are used as ‘disposal sites for waste rejected’ by more
developed states.14 The term ‘colonialism’ is used to signify the relationship
between countries in the Global North that export the risks of toxic waste to
countries in the Global South, who do not ‘share in the beneﬁts of the
production process that generate those wastes’.15 This pattern resembles some
of the characteristics of historical colonialism in that toxic colonialism
is similarly driven by economic dependence, exploitation, and inequality.16
9 See Workineh Kelbessa, ‘Environmental Injustice in Africa,’ (2012) 9 Contemporary
Pragmatism, 99–132.
10 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor 2 (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 2011) (discussing the analogous concept of slow violence).
11 Id. at 3.
12 Id. At 3.
13 See Rob White, ‘Toxic Cities: Globalizing the Problem of Waste’ (2008), 35 Social Justice 107.
14 Laura A. Pratt, ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping? A Reevaluation of Toxic Waste Colonialism and
the Global Management of Transboundary Hazardous Waste’ (2011), 41 Texas Environmental
Law Journal, 147, 151. The chapter discusses how the term ‘toxic colonialism’ was coined by
Greenpeace to describe the dumping of ‘industrial wastes of the West on territories of the Third
World.’
15 See e.g. Samuel Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation: The Dumping of
Toxic Waste in Africa’ (1993), 30 International Studies, 277, 278 discussing the unfairness of this
relationship.
16 See Pratt, ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 152.
Prosecuting Dirty Dumping in Africa 555
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108525343.021
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 24.3.197.25, on 13 Aug 2019 at 11:49:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
As I noted elsewhere, regime complexes consist of ‘several legal agreements
that are created and maintained in distinct fora with participation of different
sets of actors.’17 They allow for greater creativity and ﬂexibility. This adaptabil-
ity is evident in the types of crimes covered by the regional criminal court,
especially the attempt to regulate the trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief background on
how the history of toxic colonialism in Africa helped to inform the attempt to
criminalize the trafﬁcking of hazardous waste in the Malabo Protocol. Section 3
explores instead how the inadequate international legal framework for regulat-
ing hazardous waste, led to the criminalization of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste
in the Malabo Protocol. Section 4 analyzes how the regional prosecution of
trafﬁcking in hazardous waste contributes towards some of the newer theories of
punishment, as well as some of the more traditional goals of punishment. This
section also discusses how any potential challenges might be resolved through
creative interpretation of the Protocol. Lastly, this chapter concludes that the
regional criminal court’s prosecution of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste presents
another option for African states whose domestic judiciaries and related insti-
tutions may not be able to prosecute trafﬁcking in hazardous waste, and the
international system, which has failed to prosecute trafﬁcking in hazardous
waste or corporations involved in toxic dumping.
2. overview of toxic colonialism in africa
All of the toxic dumping incidents discussed in this section share the disturb-
ing pattern of toxic colonialism, marked by economic dependence, exploit-
ation, and inequality.
A. The Global Increase and Causes of Trafﬁcking in Hazardous Waste
In 2000, the worldwide generation of hazardous waste was four hundred million
metric tonnes, with almost all of this amount originating from developed
nations.18 It is estimated that by 2020, the total production of hazardous waste
in the Global North will have increased by 60% annually.19 Most of the
estimates of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste from the Global
17 Kal Raustiala & David Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (2004). 58
International Organizations 277, 279.
18 See David Hunter, James Salzmann and Durwood Zaelke, ‘International Environmental Law
and Policy’ Third Edition (New York: Foundation Press 2007).
19 See David Naguib Pellow, ‘Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for
Environmental Justice’ (Massachusetts: The MIT Press 2007).
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North to the Global South are quite small.20 However, all of the estimates are
based on the legal transfer of hazardous waste, as the quantiﬁcation of ‘illegal
transboundary exchanges of hazardous waste is much more difﬁcult.’21
Irrespective of the exact amount of hazardous waste; toxic dumping in Africa
is a signiﬁcant problem for a number of reasons. People that are exposed to
toxic waste can experience dire health consequences ranging from respiratory
problems, birth defects, burns, miscarriages, nausea, severe headaches, paraly-
sis, frequent illness, irritation of the eyes and skin, various types of cancer, brain
damage, intestinal disease, stunted growth, harm to the immune system,
pathological conditions, and death.22 If not properly treated, toxic waste can
not only threaten human life, but also lead ‘to ecological, geological, and
environmental disasters’ as contaminated ‘soil, groundwater, and streams can
endanger public health and the environment.’23 A signiﬁcant percentage of
Africans live in rural areas that are dependent on groundwater and streams for
domestic and agricultural uses.24 In addition, the disposal of hazardous waste in
landﬁlls can easily result in water and food contamination.25 The lack of the
necessary infrastructure including facilities, environmental technology, and
economic resources means that toxic dumping on the Continent has much
more devastating consequences, than it does elsewhere.26
Given all of these negative consequences, why does toxic colonialism
persist? The key driver is proﬁt.27 Toxic colonialism is also furthered by
certain structural changes of and in the global system, including the restruc-
turing of the nation-state and the growth of interdependence’.28 The age of
globalization29 is marked by the increased mobility of capital and competi-
tion amongst states to attract foreign direct investment. For example, the
amount of money offered for permission to import hazardous waste into
20 See e.g. Hunter et al. ‘International Environmental Law and Policy’, p. 947 estimating that
only 4% of the generated hazardous waste actually travels across borders.
21 Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 153.
22 Id. see also Kelbessa, ‘Environmental Injustice in Africa,’ p. 109.




27 See Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 154.
28 Anél Ferreira –Snyman, ‘Regionalism and the Restructuring of the United Nations with
Speciﬁc Reference to the African Union’ (2011), 44 Comparative and International Law Journal
of Southern Africa, 360, 362.
29 See Adam Lupel, ‘Regionalism and Globalization: Post-Nation or Extended Nation?’ (2004),
36 Polity 153, 159. Globalization is a term that ‘summarizes a variety of processes that together
increase the scale, speed, and effectiveness of social interactions across political, economic,
cultural, and geographical borders.’
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African countries is reportedly sometimes more than the individual country’s
gross national product, or its total foreign debt.30 Accordingly, individual
developing countries are dissuaded from taking measures that would place
additional regulations on multinational corporations (MNCs)31 such as
compliance with environmental and human rights obligations.32 For
instance, in some African countries, there are ‘no real treatment process
[es] and no proper storage’33 options for hazardous waste. Indeed, the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) noted that ‘it costs as little as $2.50
per ton to dump hazardous waste [legally] in Africa as opposed to $250 per
ton in Europe.’34 Consequently, since the late 1970s and early 1980s, toxic
waste has been exported increasingly to Africa.35
B. Historical Development of Toxic Colonialism in Africa
Toxic colonialism is manifested in many different ways: from Western MNCs
rarely having track records of safe waste disposal, to the receiving countries
not being accurately informed about the dangers of the hazardous waste,36 to
the lack of capacity of countries in the Global South to deal with the
aftermath. In the mid-1980s a number African countries had private local
companies, individuals, and governments ‘openly or secretly’ sign waste
30 See D.M. Dzidzornu, ‘Marine Pollution Control in the West and Central African Region’
(1995), 20 Queens Law Journal 439.
31 Multinational corporations (MNCs) or transnational corporations (TNCs) are economic
entities operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two
or more countries. See Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(2003).
32 See A. Lupel, ‘Regionalism and Globalization: Post Nation or Extended Nation?’ p. 157,
discussing how globalization challenges states in their: administrative effectiveness, territorial
sovereignty, collective identity, and democratic legitimacy, available online at www.ipinst.org/
images/pdfs/lupel_polity_jan2004.pdf.
33 F. Bridgland, ‘Europe’s New Dumping Ground: How the West’s Toxic Waste is Poisoning
Africa’, The Herald, 1 October 2006 available online at http://archive.ban.org/ban_news/2006/
061001_dumping_ground.html quoting the French environmental group ‘Robin Hood of the
Forest’.
34 United Nations Environmental Program, National Rapid Environmental Desk Assessment-
Somalia, 2005, p. 135 [hereinafter UNEP Report] available online at www.unep.org/tsunami/
reports/TSUNAMI_SOMALIA_LAYOUT.pdf.
35 See Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation’ p. 281 discussing French and
the U.S. exporting ‘enormous amounts of hazardous waste to Africa’.
36 See James Brooke, ‘Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa’, New York Times, 17 July 1988,
available at www.nytimes.com/1988/07/17/world/waste-dumpers-turning-to-west-africa.html?
pagewanted=all.
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disposal contracts with waste brokers.37 These contracts authorized waste
brokers ‘to use certain designated areas’ for dumping hazardous waste.38 For
example, the governments of Benin and Guinea-Bissau signed lucrative
contracts with companies in the Global North to dump hazardous waste in
their territories for a speciﬁed period of time.39 In Benin, the company falsely
described the hazardous waste material in the ten-year contract as ‘complex
organic matter’ and ‘ordinary industrial wastes’.40In Guinea, a Norwegian
shipping company brokered a deal in 1988, to dump on Kassa, a resort island
not too far from the capital.41 The company unloaded 15,000 tonnes of a
substance listed as ‘raw material for bricks’ in an abandoned quarry.42 Subse-
quently, visitors from the mainland noticed that the island’s vegetation began
to shrivel.43 A government investigation later discovered that in fact the
material was incinerator ash from Philadelphia.44 The contract originally
provided for the disposal of 85,000 tonnes of hazardous waste in Guinea.45
Following the incident, the government of Guinea arrested at least thirteen
people,46 including the Norwegian Consul-General who was accused of
forging an import licence to enable the company to import the hazardous
waste.47 International furor ensued, and a Norwegian freighter completed
removal of the hazardous waste in July of 1988.48
This pattern of toxic colonialism is replicated in Somalia’s experience with
hazardous waste dumping. In 1992, Italian and Swiss MNCs purportedly
negotiated an $80 million, twenty-year contract with the ‘Minister of Health’
to dump toxic waste.49 This is despite the reality that Somalia was embroiled
in a devastating civil war with none of the warring factions able to claim any
37 See Kelbessa, ‘Environmental Injustice in Africa,’ p. 109.
38 Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation’ p. 281.
39 For further discussion see id. pp. 285–6.




44 See id. See also Mark Jaffe, ‘Tracking the Khian Sea: Port to Port, Deal to Deal’, The
Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 July 1988 p. B1 available at http://articles.philly.com/1988–07–15/
news/26236354_1_khian-sea-coastal-carriers-incinerator-ash discussing how efforts to dispose of
the Philadelphian ash failed in Chile, Honduras, Haiti, the Bahamas, the Dominican
Republic, Costa Rica, before it reached the West Coast of Africa.
45 See Brooke, ‘Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa’.
46 See Barbara Hunton, ‘Emerging Controls on Transfers of Hazardous Waste to Developing
Countries’ (1989), 21 Law and Policy International Business p. 247.
47 See Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation’ p. 283.
48 See Brooke, ‘Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa’.
49 Hao-Nhien Q. Vu, ‘The Law of Treaties and the Export of Hazardous Waste’ (1994), 12
University of California, Los Angeles Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 389, 390.
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sense of legitimacy or hold on power. The dumping began in the early 1980s
and continued during the civil war.50 The ﬁnancial arrangements undoubt-
edly helped to fuel the conﬂict and provided powerful incentives to the
various warlords to ignore environmental and public health repercussions.51
The dumping of toxic waste in Somalia gained renewed international atten-
tion following the 2004 tsunami.52 The waves from the tsunami exposed
containers, which held ‘radioactive waste, lead, cadmium, mercury, ﬂame
retardants, hospital waste, and cocktails of other deadly residues’ on Somalia’s
shores. ‘Subsequent cancer clusters have also been linked to Europe’s special
gift to the country, delivered by that tsunami.’53 A report by UNEP said the
release of the deadly substances, has caused:
health and environmental problems to the surrounding local ﬁshing com-
munities including contamination of groundwater. Many people in these
towns have complained of unusual health problems as a result of the tsunami
winds blowing towards inland villages. The health problems include acute
respiratory infections, dry heavy coughing and mouth bleeding, abdominal
hemorrhages, unusual skin chemical reactions, and sudden death after
inhaling toxic materials.54
Italian authorities initiated an investigation into the company’s hazardous
waste trade in 1997.55 Due to the continued violence and political instability
in Somalia the prospects for a successful clean-up are limited.
The problematic pattern of countries in the Global North exporting the
risks of toxic waste to countries in the Global South, who do not share in the
beneﬁts of the production process of the waste is also exhibited in Nigeria’s
experience.56 In Nigeria, a businessman permitted two Italian MNCs to use
his residential property to store 18,000 drums of hazardous waste in 1987.57 It
was located in Koko, Nigeria a small rural community located on the river
Niger.58 The Line ship (registered in Germany) was refused entry in Europe
50 See UNEP Report p. 134.
51 See Bridgland ‘Europe’s New Dumping Ground’.
52 See Kelbessa, ‘Environmental Injustice in Africa,’ p. 109.
53 Bridgland, ‘Europe’s New Dumping Ground’.
54 UNEP Report p. 134.
55 See Kelbessa, ‘Environmental Injustice in Africa,’ p. 110.
56 For further discussion see e.g. Sylvia F. Liu, ‘The Koko Incident: Developing International
Norms for the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste’, (1992–1994) 8 Journal of
Natural Resources and Environmental Law. 121; Obinna Anyadike, ‘Toxic Terrorism’ (1988),
3696 West Africa p. 1108; ‘Nigeria: Koko’s Radioactive Waste’ (1988), West Africa, p. 1388.
57 See Kelbessa, ‘Environmental Injustice in Africa,’ p. 109.
58 See Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation’ p. 283.
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because the ship had been found to be carrying ‘highly poisonous chemical
waste’ before it made its way to Nigeria.59 The businessman charged $100 a
month for the storage of the toxic waste.60 The ship delivered four shipments
of the waste before media exposure of the crime alerted the Nigerian
authorities.61 A Nigerian construction company falsiﬁed documents to the
government, which allowed the company to import the toxic waste under the
pretence that it was importing ‘building materials.’62 In the aftermath, nine-
teen individuals in the area died, including the businessman who stored the
waste in his backyard.63 Other adverse effects included chemical burns,
paralysis of a member of the crew who reloaded the waste, and the dock-
workers that repackaged the waste on board the ship reportedly vomited
blood.64 Nigeria’s government responded forcefully – it recalled its ambas-
sador to Italy, demanded that Italy remove the waste at once, and seized an
Italian ship docked in its harbour to send the waste back to Italy.65 The
government also enacted a decree making the trafﬁcking in hazardous waste
a capital crime, but later reduced the punishment to life imprisonment.66 It
also passed a decree in 1988, which barred citizens from negotiating toxic
waste contracts with foreign companies.67
The patterns of economic dependence, exploitation, and inequality also
characterize the toxic dumping incident in Côte d’Ivoire, which occurred
more than twenty years after the Nigerian and Somalian incidents. Outrage
about toxic dumping in Nigeria in 1988, led Côte d’Ivoire to adopt a law that
provides for prison terms of up to 20 years and ﬁnes of up to $1.6 million for
individuals who import hazardous waste.68 In August of 2006, a ship named
the Probo Koala charted by the Dutch-based oil and service shipping com-
pany Traﬁgura Beheer BV, ofﬂoaded toxic waste. The Probo Koala left the
waste at the port of Abidjan, the capital city of Côte d’Ivoire.69 A local
59 Id.
60 See Kelbessa, ‘Environmental Injustice in Africa,’ p. 109.
61 See Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation’.
62 Id. p. 284.
63 See id. p. 284.
64 Id. See also Kelbessa, ‘Environmental Injustice in Africa,’ p. 109.
65 See Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation’.
66 See Joel Millman, ‘Exporting Hazardous Waste: From Developed to Third World Nations’
(1989), Tech Rev p. 1. See also Kingsley Moghalu, ‘Nigeria Gets Tough on Toxic Dumping,
(1989)’ Christian Science Monitor, p. 6.
67 See Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation’ p. 283.
68 See Brooke, ‘Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa’.
69 See Amnesty International and Greenpeace, ‘The Toxic Truth’, 9, 25 September 2012,
[hereinafter The Toxic Truth] available at www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/
international/publications/toxics/ProboKoala/The-Toxic-Truth.pdf.
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contractor of Traﬁgua disposed of the waste at approximately eighteen open-
air sites in and around the city of Abidjan.70 Similar to the hazardous dumping
incident in Nigeria, the ship attempted to discharge its waste in Europe, but
was unable to, due to the toxicity of the waste.71 Following the toxic dumping
in Abidjan, people living near the discharge sites began to suffer from a range
of illnesses including: nausea, diarrhoea, vomiting, breathlessness, headaches,
skin damage, and swollen stomachs.72 The exposure to this waste caused the
death of sixteen people, and more than 100,000 people sought medical atten-
tion.73 Traﬁgura denied any wrongdoing.74 In early 2007, the company paid
approximately $195 million for cleanup to the Ivorian government.75 The
government waived its right to prosecute the company.76 Today, more than
ten years after the dumping of large quantities of toxic waste in Côte d’Ivoire,
despite the huge numbers of people affected, international coverage of the
issue, and several legal proceedings, there remains no effective national,
regional, or international mechanism to prevent and address a similar disaster.77
According to a three-year investigative report by Amnesty International and
Greenpeace, ‘too little has been done to strengthen national and international
regulations, even after the scale of the toxic dumping became clear.’78 Green-
peace International Executive Director Kumi Naidoo stated that,
[Traﬁgura is] a story of corporate crime, human rights abuse and govern-
ments’ failure to protect people and the environment. It is a story that exposes
how systems for enforcing international law have failed to keep up with
companies that operate transnationally, and how one company has been
70 See Environmental Justice Atlas, available online at http://ejatlas.org/conﬂict/toxic-waste-
dumping-in-abidjan-ivory-coast (last visited 3 March 2015).
71 See Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Traﬁgura Lawsuits’ (re: Côte d’Ivoire),
http://business-humanrights.org/en/traﬁgura-lawsuits-re-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire (last
visited 3 March 2015); see Amnesty International and Greenpeace International Press Release
25 September 2012, www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/Press-Centre-Hub/Press-releases/
AMNESTY-INTERNATIONAL–GREENPEACE-INTERNATIONAL-PRESS-RELEASE-/
(last visited 3 March 2015).
72 See The Toxic Truth supra p. 57.
73 See id. p. 10.
74 See id. p. 9; see also Bianca Lazzari, ‘The International Movement of Hazardous Waste: The
Ivory Coast’ 28 May 2014, https://prezi.com/nd1b96exyf1j/the-international-movement-of-
hazardous-waste-the-ivory-coa/ (last visited March 2015).
75 See The Toxic Truth supra p. 9.
76 See id.
77 For further discussion see Section 3.
78 See Fiona Harvey, ‘Traﬁgura Lessons Have not Been Learned, Report Warns’, The Guardian
25 September 2012, www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/sep/25/traﬁgura-lessons-toxic-
waste-dumping.
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able to take full advantage of legal uncertainties and jurisdictional loopholes,
with devastating consequences.79
The victims of Traﬁgura’s toxic dumping in Côte d’Ivoire were not able to
seek redress in their domestic judiciary. They had to seek justice in Europe,
which ultimately proved unsatisfactory.80
The incidents of toxic colonialism discussed above indicate that several
countries attempted to take steps to limit toxic dumping in their territories by
resorting to criminal sanctions.81 These countries also utilized tort law, but
both areas of their domestic law proved to be inadequate deterrents. The spate
of toxic dumping that took place in the 1980s led the Organization of African
Unity (OAU),82 to pass a resolution urging all member states to ban all imports
of waste chemicals, metals, and radioactive materials, calling the trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste a ‘crime against Africa and the African people.’83 The OAU
passed the resolution in 1988, shortly after the toxic dumping scandal in
Nigeria had come to light. The Resolution condemned the dumping of
hazardous waste by MNCS,84 and urged its members to stop arranging for
waste dumping.85 It also sought to require that dumpers ‘clean up the areas
that have already been contaminated by them.’86 Although a non-binding
political statement, this Resolution would lay the foundation for the position
that African states would adopt regarding the importing of hazardous waste
from outside Africa. African countries’ individual experiences with toxic
colonialism are emblematic of why greater cooperation in regulating hazard-
ous waste was needed. This section has also illustrated how the experience
79 Amnesty International, ‘Report Slams Failure to Prevent Toxic Waste Dumpling in West
Africa’ 25 September 2012, available at www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2012/09/report-slams-
failure-prevent-toxic-waste-dumping-west-africa/.
80 For further discussion of the case against Traﬁgura see e.g., Cyril Gwam, ‘Symposium
Powering the Future: A 21st Century Guide for Energy Practitioners: Human Rights
Implications of Illicit Toxic Waste Dumping from Developing Countries Including the
U.S.A., Especially Texas to Africa, in particular Nigeria’ (2013), 38 Thurgood Marshall Law
Review 241, 259–66; Holy Hall, ‘Super-Injunction, What’s Your Function’ (2013), 18
Commercial Law and Policy 309, 320–2.
81 See Chris Okeke, ‘Africa and the Environment’ (1996), 3 Annual Survey of International &
Comparative Law 37, 62.
82 The OAU ‘steered Africa’s political and ideological matters since its inception’ in Abou Jeng,
‘Peacebuilding in the African Union’ p. 136.
83 Article 1 of the Organization of African Unity: Council of Ministers Resolution on Dumping of
Nuclear and Industrial Waste in Africa, 23 May 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 568 (1989)
[hereinafter OAU Resolution].
84 Id. art. 2.
85 Id. art. 3.
86 Id. art. 2.
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with toxic colonialism on the Continent would later inﬂuence the decision to
attempt to regionally criminalize the trafﬁcking of hazardous waste in the
Malabo Protocol.
3. international legal framework for regulating
hazardous waste and african regional innovation
This section will explore how the inadequate international legal framework for
regulating hazardous waste, led to the attempt to criminalize the trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste regionally in Africa. The intention here is not to provide a
comprehensive analysis of the main shortcomings of this area of international
law.87 Instead, this section brieﬂy highlights the existing state of international
law governing the import of hazardous waste and the control of transboundary
movements of such wastes and analyzes African attempts to innovate region-
ally. This section demonstrates how African states have been at the forefront of
efforts to penalize trafﬁcking in hazardous waste – leading the way through a
ban in a regional treaty, which would subsequently be reﬂected more gener-
ally in international law. African states once again are at the forefront of
shaping international law in this area by moving to prosecute trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste through the Malabo Protocol.
A. The Inadequate Legal Framework for Regulating Hazardous Waste
This section provides much needed context on the international regulation of
hazardous waste. The treaty governing this area, the Basel Convention of 1989,
did not provide for a complete prohibition on the trafﬁcking of hazardous
waste. Consequently, African states insisted on such a ban in a regional treaty –
the Bamako Convention of 1991. To date, the international regime governing
this area of law has not adopted the abolitionist position seen in the Bamako
Convention. Efforts to change the international regime through an amend-
ment to the Basel Convention (Basel Ban Amendment), which would adopt
the African prohibition on hazardous waste rule globally have stalled due to
the resistance of countries in the Global North. This stalemate at the inter-
national level regarding the prohibition on hazardous waste helps to explain in
part why African States through the Malabo Protocol, are attempting to create
87 For more on the limitations of the current legal framework see generally Robert Percival,
‘Global Law and the Environment,’ (2011) 86 Washington Law Review, 579; Frederic Megret,
‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment,’ (2011) 36 Columbia
Journal of Environmental Law 195 (2011); Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’.
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a regional forum for prosecuting the crime of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.
Article 28L in the Malabo Protocol can only be understood against this
background as it incorporates provisions articulated in the regional Bamako
Convention of 1991.
1. International Regulation through the Basel Convention of 1989
The Basel Convention of 1989, which entered into force in 1992 is the primary
international agreement for the regulation of hazardous waste.88 Prior to this
treaty, the international regulation in this area consisted of non-binding soft-
law. For example, in 1987 UNEP gathered a group of experts to develop an
agreement for the ‘environmentally sound management of hazardous waste,’
which came to be known as the Cairo Guidelines.89 Global concerns
regarding hazardous waste ‘sparked a desire to create a more binding agree-
ment’ and led to the Basel Convention.90
The Basel Convention imposes certain general obligations on States
Parties. These general obligations include ensuring that the generation of
hazardous wastes within the State is ‘reduced to a minimum, taking into
account social, technological, and economic aspects.’91 As of October 2018,
186 states are party to the Basel Convention.92 The Basel Convention works
more like a trade regime – in that it seeks to control the movement of
hazardous waste ‘through a system of prior informed consent, strict notiﬁca-
tion, and tracking requirements.’93 Under this system, the movement of
hazardous waste is only permitted where the exporting country does not have
the capacity to dispose of the material ‘in an environmentally sound and
efﬁcient manner,’ or the waste is required in the importing country as a raw
material for recycling or recovery.94 The Basel Convention also requires
certain notiﬁcation between State Parties when hazardous wastes will be
moved between or among them. To start, the State of export must notify the
88 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their
Disposal, Basel, 22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 I.L.M. 649 also available at www.basel
.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf. [hereinafter Basel
Convention].
89 UNEP, Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of
Hazardous Waste, 14/30 December, 17 June 1987 available at www.unep.org/Documents
.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=100&ArticleID=1663&l=en.
90 Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 158.
91 Art. 4(2) of the Basel Convention.
92 See Parties to the Basel Convention available at www.basel.int/Countries/
StatusofRatiﬁcations/PartiesSignatories/tabid/4499/Default.aspx (last visited 23 October 2018).
93 Id. at 160. See also Art. 6 of the Basel Convention.
94 Art. 4(9) of the Basel Convention. See also Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 160.
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State of import of any proposed transport of hazardous wastes.95 The State of
import must then respond in writing, expressing its consent to the movement,
denying permission for the movement, or requesting additional information.96
The Convention also prohibits the transboundary movement of hazardous
waste exported to a non-Party or imported from a non-Party.97
Article 9 provides that any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or
other wastes is considered ‘illegal’, if the movement occurs:
(a) without notiﬁcation pursuant to the provisions of this Convention to all
states concerned; or
(b) without the consent pursuant to the provisions of this Convention of a
State concerned; or
(c) with consent obtained from States concerned through falsiﬁcation,
misrepresentation or fraud; or
(d) [in a manner] that does not conform in a material way with the
documents; or
(e) [in a manner] that results in deliberate disposal (e.g.) dumping of
hazardous wastes or other wastes in contravention of this Convention
and of general principles of international law.98
In the event of illegal trafﬁcking in hazardous waste the Basel Convention
provides depending on fault that the exporter or generating state take back the
waste if practicable or otherwise dispose of it.99 Where the importer or the
disposing state is found to be at fault, then that state is responsible for disposal
in an environmentally safe manner; and where it is unclear who is at fault
amongst the parties, then the Convention provides that the parties are to
cooperate to make sure that the waste is disposed of in an environmentally
sound manner.100 Rather than seeking enforcement through an international
or regional court, the Basel Convention provides that each party shall intro-
duce appropriate national/domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal
trafﬁcking.101 The parties to the Basel Convention envisioned that enforce-
ment would take place through a tort-law regime.102 They subsequently
enacted a Protocol setting out appropriate rules and procedures for liability
and compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary movement
95 See Art. 6(1) of the Basel Convention.
96 Id. art. 6(2).
97 Id. art. 4(5).
98 Id. art. 9(1).
99 Id. art 9(2).
100 Id. art 9(2).
101 Id. art. 9(5).
102 Id. art. 12.
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and disposal of hazardous wastes and other wastes.103 The Basel Convention
does not provide for prosecutions of trafﬁckers of hazardous waste through an
international or transnational court like that Malabo Protocol envisions.
1. Other Attempts at International Regulation of Hazardous Waste
The Basel Convention has been followed by other subsequent agreements
and amendments, which continue to shape the international regulation of
hazardous waste. For example, African, Caribbean (ACP) states signed the
Lomé IV Convention in 1990 with the European Economic Community.104
The Lomé IV Convention prohibited the export of hazardous waste from the
European Community to ACP States, and in return the ACP states agreed not
to accept waste from any country outside of the European Community.105 The
agreement between the ACP states noted that in interpreting the provisions of
the ban it would be guided by the principles and provisions in an 1988 OAU
Resolution,106 which amongst others considered the trafﬁcking in hazardous
waste to be a ‘crime against Africa and the African people.’107 The Lomé IV
Convention expired in 2000.108
Overlapping regimes can result in a “race to the bottom”109 with countries
seeking lower barriers to entry. That is instead of states deciding to bind
themselves to higher obligations, states can seek to lower their obligations.
The Cotonou Agreement, which replaced the Lomé IV Convention between
the European Community and ACP states in 2000 illustrates this point.110 The
Cotonou Agreement backtracks from the hazardous waste ban contained in
103 See Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, 10 December 1999, in force 27 May
2014 available at www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/
BaselConventionText-e.pdf. [hereinafter Basel Protocol].
104 See The Fourth African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc States – European Economic Community
Convention of Lomé, Lome, 22March 1990, 29 I.L.M. 783 available at http://aei.pitt.edu/4220/
1/4220.pdf [hereinafter Lomé IV Convention].
105 Art. 39 of the Lomé IV Convention.
106 Annex VIII of the Lomé IV Convention, Joint Declaration on Article 39 on Movements of
Hazardous Waste or Radioactive Waste.
107 OAU Resolution.
108 See Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 166.
109 Kenneth W. Abbott, The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change, 30 Environment
and Planning C: Government & Policy 584 (2012) (discussing how this can lead to
“pathological effects of unnecessary fragmentation”).
110 See generally Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Paciﬁc Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States,
of the Other Part, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3 (entered into force 4 January 2003) [hereinafter Cotonou
Agreement] available at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/ﬁles/cotonou-agreement-
2000_en.pdf.
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the Lomé IV Agreement. Instead, the Agreement takes “into account issues
relating to the transport and disposal of hazardous wastes.”111 Without the total
ban, the Cotonou Agreement is signiﬁcantly weakened.112 African states have
attempted to improve upon these attempts at regulating hazardous waste.
2. Regional Innovation and Regulation of Hazardous Waste through
Bamako Convention of 1991
Signiﬁcantly, the OAU expanded on its 1988 Resolution and adopted the
Bamako Convention in 1991, which created a regional ban on the importation
of all hazardous waste into Africa and limits the transfer of hazardous waste
within Africa.113 The Bamako Convention entered into force in 1998 and
imposes a duty on states to take legal, administrative, and other measures to
prohibit the import of any hazardous wastes into their territories.114 Moreover,
the Convention stipulates that any importation of hazardous waste into Africa,
‘shall be deemed illegal and a criminal act.’115 This was a pointed development
from the Basel Convention, which considered trafﬁcking ‘illegal,’ but not
criminal.116 The Bamako Convention also imposes, ‘strict, unlimited liability
as well as joint and several liability on hazardous waste generators.’117 This was
another important improvement over the Basel Convention, which did not
stipulate the rules for liability within the Convention.118 With respect to
hazardous waste generated within Africa, the Convention mimics the Basel
Convention provisions.119 As of October 2018, the Bamako Convention had
twenty-nine signatories, and twenty-ﬁve parties.120
111 Id. art. 32(1)(d).
112 See Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 166.
113 See generally Bamako Convention.
114 Art. 4 of the Bamako Convention.
115 Id.
116 See Art. 9 of the Basel Convention.
117 Art. 4(3)(b) of the Bamako Convention; Art. 1(20) of the Bamako Convention deﬁning a waste
generator as ‘any person whose activity produces hazardous wastes, or, if that person is not
known, the person who is in possession and/or control of those wastes’.
118 See Art. 12 of the Basel Convention.
119 See Art. 11 of the Bamako Convention (For intra-African waste trade, parties must minimize the
transboundary movement of wastes and only conduct it with consent of the importing and
transit states among other controls. Parties are to minimize the production of hazardous wastes
and cooperate to ensure that wastes are treated and disposed of in an environmentally sound
manner.
120 See Parties to the Bamako Convention www.unenvironment.org/events/conference/second-
conference-parties-bamako-convention (last visited 11 March 2018).
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The Bamako Convention parallels the Basel Convention, with some
important distinctions. The Bamako Convention, like the Basel Convention,
imposes certain general obligations on States Parties,121 but as indicated above,
the Bamako Convention imposes signiﬁcantly more aggressive obligations.
OAU member states were dissatisﬁed with the Basel Convention, which does
not explicitly ban the export of hazardous waste.122 Accordingly, almost all
OAU countries except for Nigeria, refused to ratify the initial Basel Conven-
tion.123 Recall that the Basel Convention has a limited ban on exports and
imports of hazardous waste to and from non-parties to the Convention.124
Thus, one of the key motivations for the creation of the African regional
convention was the failure of the Basel Convention to ban imports of hazard-
ous waste from more developed countries into less developed ones. Conse-
quently, the ﬁrst general obligation imposed by the Bamako Convention is a
hazardous waste import ban, which states in part, ‘[a]ll Parties shall take
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures within the area under
their jurisdiction to prohibit the import of all hazardous wastes, for any reason,
into Africa from non-Contracting Parties. . .’125
The Basel and Bamako Conventions in many ways reﬂect the split between
the Global North and South in the regulation of hazardous waste – with the
Global North favouring a free-trade model for hazardous waste, and the
Global South demanding a total ban on toxic waste.126 Both views emanate
from concerns over enforcement – with the Global North viewing a total ban
as impossible to enforce, and the Global South viewing the free-trade model
as impossible to monitor or control effectively due to disparities in techno-
logical and environmental infrastructure.127 The Global South’s view was
reinforced by the series of toxic dumping scandals that took place in Africa
even after the Basel Convention came into force.128 This may also help to
explain why the scope of what constitutes hazardous waste in the Bamako
Convention is much wider, than what the Basel Convention covers.129
121 Art. 4 of the Bamako Convention.
122 See Jennifer R. Kitt, ‘Note, Waste Exports to the Developing World: A Global Response’
(1995), 7 Georgetown Environmental Law Review 485, 500–1.
123 See Vu, ‘The Law of Treaties and the Export of Hazardous Waste’ p. 410.
124 See Art. 4(5) of the Basel Convention.
125 Art. 4(1) of the Bamako Convention.
126 See Atteh, ‘Political Economy of Environmental Degradation’ p. 283.
127 See id.
128 See Section 2B of this Chapter.
129 Compare art. 1, Annex I and Annex II of the Basel Convention, with art. 7, annex I and annex
II of the Bamako Convention. The Bamako Convention not only includes radioactive wastes,
but also considers any waste with a listed hazardous characteristic or a listed constituent as a
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Crucially, the Bamako Convention also provides that the import of hazard-
ous waste, ‘shall be deemed illegal and a criminal act.’130 Like the Basel
Convention, the Bamako Convention also contains a section on the illegality
of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.131 While the Bamako Convention reiterates
the ﬁve conditions of illegality, quoted above in the Basel Convention the
Bamako Convention goes much further. It stipulates that, ‘[e]ach Party shall
introduce appropriate national legislation for imposing criminal penalties on all
persons who have planned, committed, or assisted in such illegal imports. Such
penalties shall be sufﬁciently high to both punish and deter such conduct.’132 As
such, the Bamako Convention envisions that trafﬁcking in hazardous waste will
be regulated not simply through a tort-law regime like the Basel Convention,
but crucially through each state’s domestic penal law. Thus, the Bamako
Convention provides a clear rationale to understand the later move to create
a regional forum to prosecute the trafﬁcking of hazardous waste in the Malabo
Protocol. It is likely that parties found that only relying on domestic enforce-
ment to prosecute trafﬁcking in hazardous waste was leading to insufﬁcient
punishment and deterrence and likely anticipated that the creation of a
regional court through the Malabo Protocol would lead to better results.
3. From Regional Innovation through Bamako to Attempts to Strengthen
the International Regulatory Framework through Basel
Moreover, the overlapping Bamako and Basel regimes for regulating trafﬁck-
ing in hazardous waste led to generative outcomes for the progressive
development of international law. Some scholars have postulated that com-
peting regimes can ‘generate positive feedback: providing incentives for a
‘race to the top.’’133 This occurs where countries take stronger action on a
given issue in one regime, which generates imitation by others.134 An
excellent example of this is how the Bamako Convention’s imposition of
strict liability on ‘hazardous waste generators’135 inﬂuenced the Basel
hazardous waste. The Convention also covers national deﬁnitions of hazardous waste. Finally,
products that are banned, severely restricted, or have been the subject of prohibitions, are also
covered under the Convention as wastes.
130 Art. 4(1) of the Bamako Convention.
131 Compare Art. 9 of the Basel Convention with Article 9 of the Bamako Convention.
132 Art. 9(2) of the Bamako Convention.
133 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2011), 9
‘Perspective on Politics’ 19.
134 See id.
135 Art. 4(3)(b) and art. 1(20) of the Bamako Convention.
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Convention’s Protocol on Liability and Compensation.136 Recall, the
Bamako Convention entered into force in 1998,137 while the Basel Conven-
tion required parties to create and adopt a protocol on liability in 1989.138
The Basel Protocol was only adopted after heated negotiations in December
of 1999.139 The Basel Protocol provides for strict liability for damages where
parties to the Convention maintain control of the hazardous waste, but any
person can also be subject to fault-based liability under the general prin-
ciples of tort law.140 The Protocol needs twenty ratiﬁcations to enter into
force, and as of October 2018, only had eleven ratiﬁcations.141 The stalled
efforts at ratiﬁcation reﬂects the continued split between the Global North
and South on the regulation of hazardous waste.
Another instance of how the Bamako Convention is inﬂuencing inter-
national law regulating hazardous waste is the Basel Ban Amendment.142 In
1995, state parties to the Basel Convention decided by consensus that a total
ban of hazardous waste should be developed.143 The Ban Amendment would
go further than the Bamako Convention by prohibiting all exports of hazard-
ous wastes between developed and developing countries, not just exports and
imports within Africa like the Bamako Convention.144 The Ban Amendment
technically needs sixty-two ratiﬁcations to come into effect.145 And as of
October 2018, ninety-ﬁve parties have ratiﬁed the Ban, yet the amendment
has still not entered into force.146 Countries have failed to reach agreement on
how the provisions relating to amendment of the Basel Convention should be
136 See generally Basel Protocol.
137 See Bamako Convention.
138 See art. 12 of the Basel Convention.
139 See Pratt pp. 163–4.
140 See arts. 4 and 5 of the Basel Convention.
141 See List of Parties and Signatories to Basel Protocol available at www.basel.int/Countries/
StatusofRatiﬁcations/TheProtocol/tabid/1345/Default.aspx.
142 See Decision III/1 Amendment to the Basel Convention, Third Meeting of the Conference of
the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous
Waste and Their Disposal, September 18–22, 1995, UN Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35.
143 The eighty-two parties present at the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the
Basel Convention adopted the decision by consensus on 22 September, 1995. Id. See also
art. 4A and Annex VII of the Basel Convention [hereinafter Ban Amendment].
144 Id. Compare with Bamako Convention.
145 See art. 17(5) of the Basel Convention which provides that amendments enter into force
between the parties when ‘at least three-fourths of the Parties who accepted them ratify the
amendment. See also Pratt, ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 163 noting that sixty-two
ratiﬁcations represent three-fourths of the parties present at the Third Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties.
146 See Parties to the Ban Amendment, available at www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatiﬁcations/
BanAmendment/tabid/1344/Default.aspx (last visited 23 October 2018).
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interpreted.147 In 2011, state parties agreed that the Ban Amendment will enter
into force when three-fourths of those parties that were parties at the time of
the adoption of the amendment ratify it.148 Countries in the Global South and
Global North have continued to be split on the need and utility of a total ban
on hazardous waste. Because the Basel Convention is a compromise docu-
ment, the basic obligations under the treaty regime had to be lower in order to
get more state parties to join the regime.149 The delayed efforts at getting a
harder enforcement regime in place under the Basel Convention, provides
additional normative justiﬁcation for the Malabo Protocol’s move to create a
regional court to prosecute trafﬁckers of hazardous waste.
Currently, the only international agreement, which bans the import of
hazardous waste is the Bamako Convention. The rest of the international
agreements in this area seek to put varying levels of control on the transbound-
ary movements of such wastes. In sum, since tougher international action on
trafﬁcking in hazardous waste has been lacking, the need for African states to
act regionally to create a venue for penalizing and punishing bad actors under
the Malabo Protocol has only been reinforced. The African innovation in the
ﬁeld of environmental and criminal law is like how regional systems have
demonstrated creativity and ﬂexibility elsewhere. For example, regional
systems have demonstrated creativity and ﬂexibility in other areas of law by
adopting regional human rights treaties to ﬁll the gaps in international law.150
Regional systems also innovated to cover rights and duties not recognized in
the main international human rights treaties.151 The regional human rights
system has functioned to strengthen the enforcement of human rights across
the globe and ﬁll in gaps that the international system alone cannot
147 For further discussion see Overview Basel Convention Ban Amendment available at
www.basel.int/Implementation/LegalMatters/BanAmendment/Overview/tabid/1484/Default
.aspx (last visited 23 October 2018).
148 See id.
149 See Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 163 discussing how the option of a total ban was
tabled until future conferences of the parties.
150 See e.g. Chaloki Beyani, ‘Reconstituting the Universal: Human Rights as a Regional Idea’
(2012), Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law, 176.
151 Compare the concept of peoples’ rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
27 June 1981, in force 21October 1986 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 and concept of duties in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 2 May 1948, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at 1 with the omission of these concepts from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, UN Doc. A/RES/217
(III), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, S. Exec. Rep.
102–23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 16 December 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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accommodate.152 Given the experience of regionalization in the international
human rights regime, a similar outcome may pertain in the ﬁelds of inter-
national environmental and criminal law.
The regional criminalization of hazardous waste in the Bamako Conven-
tion allows for more regulation than was possible at the global level. The
international regime created by the Basel Convention does not provide for any
enforcement mechanisms for illegal trafﬁcking. Instead, it provides that parties
should adopt domestic legislation for the prevention and punishment of
trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.153 Since the OAU resolution in 1988, African
states have considered the trafﬁcking in hazardous waste to be a ‘criminal
act’.154 This view was encapsulated in the Bamako Convention provision that
states should adopt national laws to impose criminal penalties ‘on all persons
who have planned, committed, or assisted’ in the illegal trafﬁcking in hazard-
ous waste.155 These penalties were to be ‘sufﬁciently high to both punish and
deter such conduct.’156 The analysis above has shown that despite the strong
provisions of the Bamako Convention,157 the state parties to Bamako simply
lacked the capacity to effectively enforce the provisions domestically and
prevent toxic colonialism within their borders.158 Indeed, none of the inter-
national legal agreements discussed above have contained the illegal trade in
hazardous waste, which is often transported under false pretences.159 Cer-
tainly, no state has the ability to check and inspect each shipment that enters
its port to see, if it contains hazardous waste.160 Notwithstanding the wide-
spread capacity limitations on an individual state level, the Malabo Protocol
provides a potentially more robust venue for the regional prosecutions of
trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.
Article 28L of the Malabo Protocol is derived from longstanding efforts by
African states to criminalize and punish trafﬁcking in hazardous waste. Cer-
tainly, the Bamako Convention envisioned future regional agreements
regarding the transboundary movement and management of hazardous wastes
152 See Beyani ‘Reconstituting the Universal: Human Rights as a Regional Idea’ p. 190;
George William Mugwanya, ‘Realizing Universal Human Rights Norms through Regional
Human Rights Mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African System’ (1999), 10 Indiana
International & Comparative Law Review 35, 40.
153 See art. 4(5) of the Basel Convention.
154 See the OAU Resolution.
155 See art 9(2) of the Bamako Convention.
156 Id.
157 See art 4 of the Bamako Convention.
158 See Section 2B of this chapter.
159 See Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 167.
160 Id. pp. 167 and 173.
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generated in Africa and allowed for such arrangements so long as they ‘do not
derogate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes as
required’ by Bamako and are ‘no less environmentally sound than those
provided for’ under the Bamako Convention.161 Article 28L of the Malabo
Protocol is consistent with the Bamako Convention and promotes ‘South-
South co-operation in the implementation of the Convention’162 through the
creation of a regional forum for prosecutions of trafﬁckers of hazardous waste
amongst others.
B. African Regional Innovation and Enforcement through Malabo
This section discusses some of the legal and practical challenges that might
arise with the enforcement of article 28L. Under the Bamako Convention,
state parties were urged to cooperate and consider other ‘enforcement mech-
anisms’ to ensure that no imports of hazardous waste enter Africa.163 The
Malabo Protocol is potentially such an enforcement mechanism – it creates a
regional venue for prosecuting trafﬁcking in hazardous waste, amongst other
crimes. The Protocol improves upon the international framework for regulat-
ing the trafﬁcking of hazardous waste. Article 28L of the Malabo Protocol
provides that ‘any import, or failure to re-import transboundary movement or
export hazardous waste proscribed by the Bamako Convention . . . shall
constitute the offence of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste’ and fall under the
criminal jurisdiction of the regional court.164 Yet, there are several uncertain-
ties as to how Article 28L should be interpreted. Moreover, there are a host of
political, ﬁnancial, and other obstacles that may impede the regional criminal
court’s ability to offer a robust prosecution mechanism for the trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste. The sub-sections below discuss both issues in turn.
1. Interpretative Challenges
Article 28L potentially invites confusion as it requires reference to a separate
legal text to determine the relevant criminal prohibitions. When one turns to
the Bamako Convention, article 1(22) informs the reader that illegal trafﬁcking
‘means any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes as speciﬁed in
article 9 of this Convention.’165 Article 9(2) provides for the criminal penalties
161 Art. 11(1) of the Bamako Convention.
162 Id. art. 11(4).
163 See Art. 4(1)(b) of the Bamako Convention.
164 Art. 28L of the Malabo Protocol.
165 Art. 1(22) of the Bamako Convention.
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to be imposed on ‘all persons who have planned, committed, or assisted’ in
illegal trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.166 This occurs according to article 9(1),
when transboundary movement of waste occurs without notiﬁcation or with-
out consent of the relevant state, when consent is obtained through falsiﬁca-
tion, misrepresentation, or fraud, and when the waste does not conform
materially with the documents.167 While it might have been possible to
interpret article 28L of Malabo such that it could cover only those offences
that the Bamako Convention itself says are criminal acts under article 9, this
interpretative methodology is unavailable because of the broad scope of the
language in the last provision. Article 9(1)(e) stipulates criminal penalties
‘when hazardous waste is deliberately disposed of in contravention of the
Convention and of the general principles of international law.’168
Article 9(1)(e) of the Bamako Convention is the most ambiguous in terms
of ﬁguring out the scope of criminal liability under article 28L of the Malabo
Protocol. For one, it is not exactly clear what general principles article 9(1)
(e) refers to. And, as discussed above, the general international law frame-
work for regulating hazardous waste does not attach criminal penalties to
trafﬁcking in hazardous waste. Moreover, there are numerous ways to dis-
pose of hazardous waste in ‘contravention’ of Bamako. While article 4(1) of
the Bamako Convention clearly makes importing hazardous waste into
Africa an illegal and criminal act, it is not evident that all of the obligations
that states undertook in Bamako were to also have that effect.169 For
example, article 4(2) of the Bamako Convention, which bans the dumping
of hazardous waste at sea and in internal waters, speciﬁes that all such
actions shall be illegal, but does not contain the same ‘and a criminal act’
of article 4(1)’s prohibition.170 Thus, it is unclear whether the Malabo
Protocol wishes to expand Bamako to criminalize trafﬁcking in hazardous
waste at sea and in internal waters.
In addition, the Bamako Convention contains a host of very detailed
obligations that state parties undertook for the transportation of hazardous
waste within Africa.171 With some of these provisions – such as Bamako’s
expansive deﬁnition of what constitutes ‘hazardous waste’ – it is apparent
that the Malabo Protocol sought to include them within the criminal
166 Id. art. 9(2).
167 Id. art. 9(1)(a)–(d).
168 Id. art. 9(1)(e).
169 Id. arts. 4(1) and 4(2).
170 Id.
171 Id. art. 4(3)(i)–(u).
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jurisdiction of the court.172 However, for other obligations, like parties
agreeing ‘not to allow the export of hazardous wastes for disposal within
the area South of 60 degrees South Latitude,’173 it is not as straightforward.
Additionally, the Bamako Convention contains detailed rules about the
speciﬁc form and timing of notiﬁcations to be exchanged prior to the
transportation of hazardous wastes across borders.174 It would seem nonsens-
ical to impose criminal liability for transportation of wastes that do not
conform to every single provision in the Convention. Moreover, this is likely
not what the drafters of Malabo intended. Yet it is certainly possible to
interpret article 28L quite broadly – to criminalize any violation of any rule
or regulation contained in the Bamako Convention governing the transpor-
tation of hazardous waste across state boundaries. Accordingly, it would be
helpful if state parties further clariﬁed what exactly was being criminalized –
so that actors can be aware of the permissible and impermissible bounds of
conduct. Moreover, this would help ensure that the court’s resources are
used judiciously, and that valuable time is not spent prosecuting minor
violations of the Bamako Convention that the Malabo Protocol drafters did
not intend to criminalize nor dedicate resources towards the regional pros-
ecution of these offences.
The analysis above indicates that the Protocol needs to be much clearer
about what speciﬁcally is being made illegal and criminalized. The Bamako
Convention sets out many detailed rules relating to the transport of waste. It
seems unreasonable to impose criminal liability for transport of wastes that do
not conform with every single provision in the Convention. Accordingly,
much more clariﬁcation is needed. This is important because it potentially
violates one of the bedrock principles of criminal justice – legality. Individuals
need to be given fair warning and notice about the criminal laws such that
they can conform their conduct with the dictates of the law. In short, the
Protocol would beneﬁt from a clear statement of which ‘proscribed’ practices
it is making illegal.
172 Compare Art. 28L(2) of the Malabo Protocol with Arts. 2 and 4(3)(i) of the Bamako
Convention. Bamako not only includes radioactive wastes, but also considers any waste with a
listed hazardous characteristic or a listed constituent as a hazardous waste. The Convention
also covers national deﬁnitions of hazardous waste. Finally, products that are banned, severely
restricted, or have been the subject of prohibitions, are also covered under the Convention as
wastes to be criminally prohibited from importation into Africa. Id.
173 Art. 4(3)(1) of the Bamako Convention.
174 Id. art. 6.
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2. Practical Challenges
The regional court’s expansive jurisdiction might assist with more effective
prosecutions of toxic dumping incidents. When the Protocol enters into
force, the Court can exercise jurisdiction over trafﬁcking in hazardous waste
and other crimes committed after that date.175 The Assembly of the Heads of
State and Government, and the Peace and Security Council176 of the AU, as
well as State parties, and the independent prosecutor177 will be able to
submit cases to the Court.178 The Court can only exercise its jurisdiction
where a State accepts its jurisdiction, where the crime was committed on the
territory of the State, where the accused or victim is a national of the state,
and when the vital interests of a state are threatened by the extraterritorial acts
of non-nationals.179 The Court does not have jurisdiction over persons under
the age of eighteen during the alleged commission of the crime.180 The
Court’s provision for corporate criminal liability181 will be important in
prosecutions of trafﬁckers. Controversially, the Court does not have jurisdic-
tion over any ‘serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or
entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state ofﬁcials based on their
functions, during their tenure of ofﬁce.’182 This immunities provision is in
stark contrast with the statutes of other international criminal tribunals.183 It
has caused signiﬁcant backlash towards the court from scholars and practi-
tioners.184 This chapter discusses some of the challenges raised by the
175 See art. 46E of the Malabo Protocol.
176 See art. 2 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of
the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002), www.au.int/en/sites/default/ﬁles/Protocol_peace_
and_security.pdf) [hereinafter PSC Protocol] establishing the PSC as the permanent
mechanism for conﬂict prevention and resolution on the Continent.
177 See art. 46G of the Malabo Protocol.
178 See art. 15 of the Malabo Protocol.
179 See art. 46E of the Malabo Protocol.
180 See art. 46D of the Malabo Protocol.
181 See. art. 46C of the Malabo Protocol.
182 Art. 46A bis of the Malabo Protocol.
183 See art. 27 Rome Statute supra note 5, detailing the irrelevance of ofﬁcial capacity for
exempting someone from criminal responsibility; Art. 6 of the ICTR Statute; Art. 7 of the ICTY
Statute ; Art. 6 of the SCSL Statute.
184 See e.g., Mark Kersten, ‘What Gives? African Union Head of State Immunity’, ‘Justice in
Conﬂict’ 7 July 2014), available at http://justiceinconﬂict.org/2014/07/07/what-gives-african-
union-head-of-state-immunity/; MireilleAffa’a-Mindzie, ‘Leaders Agree on Immunity for
themselves during Expansion of African Court’, IPI Global Observatory, 23 July 2014, available
at http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/07/leaders-agree-immunity-expansion-african-court/.
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corporate criminal liability and immunity provisions for prosecuting trafﬁck-
ers of hazardous waste below.185
Further, there are myriad ﬁnancial, political and other obstacles that will
likely hinder the Court’s ability to function effectively and mount prosecutions
against trafﬁckers in hazardous waste, if they are not addressed. First, once
established, it is likely that the Court will face challenges regarding political
will to enforce decisions. It is also likely, that the regional criminal Court will
face credibility issues because of the issue of ofﬁcial immunity. Moreover, the
Court will likely have difﬁculty guarding against bias accusations, particularly
when the individuals or entities are from outside of the African region.
Additionally, the Court will probably encounter challenges ensuring adequate
funding, meeting international fair trial standards and conducting its proceed-
ings with sufﬁcient transparency. Furthermore, the Court may suffer from less
judicial and lawyering experience than exists at the international level. Not-
withstanding these logistical and conceptual concerns, the Malabo Protocol’s
criminalization and provision of a common forum for prosecutions for the
trafﬁcking of hazardous waste,186 pushes the boundaries of international
environmental and criminal law in a much-needed direction. In essence,
the failure of both domestic and international institutions to effectively deal
with trafﬁcking in hazardous waste, has created a space for African states to
innovate and attempt to change the status quo by utilizing a regional insti-
tution to criminalize and prosecute trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.
4. implications of criminalizing and prosecuting
hazardous waste regionally
Recollecting that the Bamako Convention called for the imposition of criminal
penalties domestically, and that said penalties ‘shall be sufﬁciently high to both
punish and deter’ trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.187 Further, the Bamako Con-
vention requires that Parties to the Convention ‘co-operate with one another
and with relevant African organisations, to improve and achieve the environ-
mentally sound management of hazardous wastes.’188 Because the Bamako
Convention laid the groundwork for Article 28L, this section analyzes whether
Article 28L furthers the criminal prosecution objectives of the Bamako
185 See Section 4. For further discussion see Sirleaf, ‘Regionalism, Regime Complexes and
International Criminal Justice in Africa’.
186 See art. 28L of the Malabo Protocol.
187 Art. 9(2) of the Bamako Convention.
188 Id. art. 10(1).
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Convention. It does this by analyzing the potential implications of criminalizing
and prosecuting trafﬁcking in hazardous waste regionally through the Malabo
Protocol. This section also considers whether the regional prosecution of
trafﬁcking in hazardous waste contributes towards some of the newer theories
of punishment like restorative justice and expressive condemnation, as well as
some of the more traditional goals of punishment like retribution and deter-
rence. Lastly, this section examines how some of the more pressing challenges
might be resolved through creative interpretation of the Protocol to assist with
furthering the sound regulation of hazardous wastes.
A. Regional Criminalization of Trafﬁcking in Hazardous
Waste and Retributive Justice
How should the traditional notions of criminal law, based as they are on the
idea of a natural person capable of criminal and actions, be applied to
corporations deemed responsible for illegal dumping? Further, how can we
think of the regional prosecution of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste in relation
to its ability to further retribution? Retributive justice theories of punishment
emanated from the desire for vengeance and ‘just deserts’ for offenders.189
Most modern retributivists, however, reject the notion of an ‘eye for [an] eye,’
and instead seek to determine the degree of punishment in relation to the
magnitude of the alleged crimes.190 The Malabo Protocol allows for the
imposition of prison sentences, pecuniary ﬁnes, and forfeiture of property
acquired unlawfully.191 The Protocol also stipulates that the regional Court
should be guided by the ‘gravity of the offence and the individual circum-
stances of the convicted person.’192 The analysis above indicates that states
have provided for criminal sentences ranging from twenty years to life impris-
onment and ﬁnes of up to $1.6 million for trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.193 It
is not clear how ‘grave’ the Court will determine the crime of trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste is, and whether this will comport with the sentences or ﬁnes
189 See e.g. Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual, Peace: ‘A Philosophical Proposal’, (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, Ltd, 1927); Susan Jacoby ‘Wild Justice; The Evolution of Revenge’, (New York: Harper
& Row, 1983).
190 Paul H. Robinson, ‘Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and
Empirical’ (2008), 67 Cambridge Law Journal 145, 147; see also Allison Marston Danner,
‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing’ (2001), 87
Virginia Law Review, 415, 444; Andrew Von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm:
A Living-Standard Analysis’ (1991), 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2–3.
191 Art. 43A of the Malabo Protocol.
192 Art 43A(4) of the Malabo Protocol.
193 See Section 2B.
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available domestically. If the regional Court’s sentencing or penalties for those
found guilty of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste is signiﬁcantly at variance with
domestic norms, this could frustrate the ability of the regional court to further
retributive justice goals. The Court might need to develop something akin to
the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine used by the European Court of Human
Rights,194 for sentencing and to make sure its judgments comport with the
majority of state’s practice in the region.
Furthermore, because the Malabo Protocol bars the prosecution of not only
Heads of States, but also of ‘senior state ofﬁcials’ based on their functions,195
leaders who are accused of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste could not be investi-
gated and prosecuted before the regional Court. This is a serious challenge to
the Court’s ability to fulﬁl retributive justice goals given the role that some
African leaders have played in facilitating dumping of hazardous waste in their
territories.196 Failure to prosecute all equally culpable individuals violates the
retributive principles of just deserts, as well as the principle of proportionality
that all like crimes should be treated the same.
The ability of the Court to contribute towards retributive justice goals may
also be limited because it is dependent on member states for the enforcement
of its sentences and ﬁnes.197 Complications could arise where an individual is
sentenced or an entity is ﬁned by the regional court for trafﬁcking in hazard-
ous waste, but no state indicates their willingness to accept and imprison the
sentenced person, or give effect to the ﬁne ordered by the Court. Moreover,
the Malabo Protocol also provides for the pardon or commutation of sen-
tences, where a person convicted by the regional Court, would be eligible for
a pardon or commutation in the jurisdiction where the convicted person is
imprisoned.198 In these circumstances, the regional court can issue a pardon
or commutation of a sentence based on the ‘interests of justice and the general
principles of law.’199 Depending on how the Court interprets these provisions,
this could potentially allow for states to work around the attempt to criminal-
ize and punish the trafﬁcking in hazardous waste regionally. However,
because the Malabo Protocol situates the regional criminal court within a
194 See e.g., Paul L. McKaskle, ‘The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How it Works,
and Its Future’ (2005), 40 University of San Francisco Law Review 1, 49 explaining that the
concept of margin appreciation allows for ‘countries to differ in what is acceptable under the
terms of the Convention based on cultural differences.’
195 Art. 46Abis of the Malabo Protocol.
196 See Section 2B of the chapter for further discussion.
197 See, arts. 46J and 46Jbis of the Malabo Protocol.
198 Art 46K of the Malabo Protocol.
199 Id.
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larger judicial architecture in the AU this can potentially be counteracted.
Other relevant regional bodies that may assist with issues of compliance
include the Panel of the Wise, the Peace and Security Council, and the
African Standby Force.200 Of course, the existence of a connection with
regional institutions does not completely deal with issues of non-compli-
ance.201 For all of the reasons above, the regional prosecution of trafﬁcking
in hazardous waste may have limited ability to further retribution, which is a
traditional goal of punishment and one of the Bamako Convention’s object-
ives of punishing trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.
Another concern is the court’s ability to effectively exercise its control over
offenders, especially offenders outside of the territory of any state party.
Generally, hazardous waste moves from the Global North to South. Thus,
although this will not necessarily always be the case, there is a high likelihood
that violators importing waste will be coming from states that are not parties to
the Protocol. The court may, thus, have a challenging time bringing offenders
from the Global North before the Court for trial. For this reason, the Proto-
col’s effectiveness and legitimacy could be enhanced by expanding the scope
of its cooperation regime.
B. Regional Criminalization of Trafﬁcking in Hazardous Waste
and Restorative Justice and Expressive Condemnation
1. Restorative Justice
The prosecution of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste through the regional court
may help to further restorative justice goals. Restorative justice can be con-
ceptualized as ‘a process in which offenders, victims, their representatives and
representatives of the community come together to agree on a response to a
crime.’202 The overwhelming focus is to assist with ‘re-establishing social
200 See arts. 7, 11, and 13(1) of the PSC Protocol providing the authority for the Peace and Security
Council, establishing the Panel of the Wise, and providing for the African Standby Force; Arts.
3–4 of the AU Constitutive Act.
201 George William Mugwanya, ‘International Criminal Tribunals in Africa’, in Mainsuli
Ssenyonjo (ed.), The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) pp. 307–10.
discussing the difﬁculties securing state cooperation with the criminal tribunals in Rwanda and
Sierra Leone; see also Beyani, ‘Reconstituting the Universal: Human Rights as a Regional Idea’
p. 87.
202 Linda Gröning & Jørn Jacobsen, ‘Introduction: Restorative Justice and the Criminal Justice
System’, in Linda Gröning & Jørn Jacobsen (eds.), ‘Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice:
Exploring the Relationship’ (Sweden: Santerus Academic Press, 2012) pp. 9, 12. For further
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equilibrium’203 and facilitating ‘corrective changes in the record, in relation-
ships, and in future behavior.’204 The regional court is empowered to provide
compensation and reparation to victims.205 The Malabo Protocol also provides
for the establishment of a trust fund for victims to provide legal aid and
assistance.206 The ability of the Court to contribute towards restorative justice
goals may be limited, if the Court interprets these provisions narrowly. The
Court’s ability may also be limited, if the fund for victims is under-funded, or if
reparations are administered in a problematic way. However, if the Court
follows the lead of the Inter-American Court for Human Rights in fashioning
remedies, it might order communal reparations,207 or formulate broad repara-
tive and restorative measures208, which require the state to end the conse-
quences of a violation through formulating speciﬁc policies and
programmes.209 There may also be insufﬁcient compliance with restorative
justice orders because of the Court’s dependence on member states for
enforcement.210
discussion, see generally John Braithwaite, ‘Narrative and “Compulsory Compassion”’, (2006),
31 Law & Social Inquiry: Journal of the American Bar Foundation 425 Elizabeth Kiss, ‘Moral
Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reﬂections on Restorative Justice’, in
Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis F. Thompson (eds.), ‘Truth v. Justice: The Morality of the Truth
Commissions’ (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000) pp. 68, 79–83.
203 Jennie E. Burnet, ‘(In)Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda’s Gacaca’, in
Alexander L. Hinton (ed.), Transitional Justice Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after
Genocide and Mass Violence, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2011), pp. 95, 100.
204 Martha Minow, ‘Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass
Violence’ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999).
205 See art. 20 of the Malabo Protocol.
206 See art. 46M of the Malabo Protocol.
207 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (29March 2006) The Court fashioned an order,
which provided that the state was to allocate $1 million to a community development fund for
educational, housing agricultural, and health projects. In addition, the state was to provide
compensation of $20,000 each to the 17 members of the community who died because of
events.
208 For further discussion, see Thomas M. Antkowiak, ‘An Emerging Mandate for International
Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice’ (2011), 47 Stanford Journal of
International Law 279.
209 See e.g. Miguel Castro Prison v. Peru Merits, Reparations and Costs Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160 (25 November 2006) The Court’s order provided amongst others
that the state needed to carry out a public act of acknowledgement of its international
responsibility in relation to the violations declared and for satisfaction of the next of kin. The
state also had to conduct a public ceremony covered by the media, carry out human rights
education and programs for the security sector, as well as create a monument for those who
died as a form of reparations.
210 See Section 4B for further discussion.
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The Court could potentially be a vehicle for regional innovation in providing
fuller redress to victims. The Court might even require a convicted defendant
to participate in local reconciliatory procedures as a means of securing repar-
ations to victims. It is premature to determine how broadly the Court will
construe these provisions. But, this would be an improvement on the ‘imagined
victims’ of international justice advocates. These ‘imagined victims’ always
demand retributive justice, when in reality, victims have diverse desires for
redress, which also emphasize reparative and restorative justice.211 Restorative
justice approaches may be especially important for the crime of trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste, given the dire consequences that toxic dumping has on public
health and the environment.212 The detrimental impact of trafﬁcking in haz-
ardous waste for individuals and communities, may mean that imprisonment of
trafﬁckers or other retributive measures have less import in achieving justice as
conceived by the affected community. This is particularly important in some
communities within African countries where justice is conceptualized in ‘ref-
erence to communal restoration, inter-personal forgiveness, and reconciliation,
and redistributive, rather than retributive process.’213Consequently, the regional
prosecution of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste under Malabo may further restora-
tive justice goals. Thus, Art. 28L would assist with furthering the Bamako
Convention’s objectives of punishment for trafﬁckers of hazardous waste.
2. Expressive Condemnation
The prosecution of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste through the Court may also
help to further expressive condemnation goals. Some theorists emphasize the
expressive value of punishment,214 which is required to reverse the false
211 See Laurel E. Fletcher, ‘Refracted Justice: The Imagined Victim and the International
Criminal Court’, in Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall, Carsten Stahn, (eds.), ‘Contested Justice:
The Politics and Practice of the International Criminal Court Interventions’, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015) pp. 2, 15 (available at www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/
faculty/facultyPubsPDF.php?facID=517&pubID=41.
212 See Section 2A for further discussion.
213 Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Between International Criminal Justice and Injustice: On the Methodology of
Legitimacy’, draft paper on ﬁle with author, p 29.
214 See, e.g., Emile Durkheim, ‘The Division of Labour in Society’, (New York: : Simon and
Schuster, 1997); David Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy
of International Criminal Law’, in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulaseds, ‘The Philosophy of
International Law’ (New York: : Oxford University Press, 2010) pp. 569, 575; Robert D. Sloane,
‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law’ (2007), 43 Stanford Journal of
International Law 39, 42–5; Dan M. Kahan, ‘What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?’ (1996), 63
University of Chicago Law Review 597.
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message sent by the offender’s actions about the value of the victim relative to
the criminal.215 These theorists view punishment as a form of moral communi-
cation used to express condemnation, revalidate a victim’s worth, and
strengthen social solidarity. Yet, the ability of the Court to further expressive
condemnation goals of punishment may be limited for several reasons. First,
regional powers may tend to distort or even abuse regional processes216 by
using the Court to further political aims or protecting allies from the court’s
reach. In the same way that powerful actors may shield their allies from
potential prosecutions at the domestic or international level, the Court may
exhibit the same tendencies. For example, the AU has been notoriously silent
on human rights violations taking place in Zimbabwe and other countries
with inﬂuential or revered leaders.217 The Court could then be subject to the
criticism that it lacks sufﬁcient political independence, which may limit the
ability of the Court to be a robust mechanism for expressing condemnation of
trafﬁcking in hazardous waste. Yet, because there are multiple regional hege-
mons on the Continent, this may counteract the ability of one state to exercise
undue inﬂuence over the regional criminal chamber. Additionally, there is no
reason to think of African states as a monolith -regional hegemons may have
drastically different views on expressing condemnation on the trafﬁcking of
hazardous waste.
The criminalization of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste may assist in
rendering international criminal trials more credible in expressing condem-
nation. International criminal trials generally focus on individual cases, and
not the complex relationships that exist between individuals, groups, insti-
tutions, and other entities that make massive violations possible.218 And in the
effort to move away from collectivizing guilt (which may lead to further
violence or recriminations) and instead attempt to individualize guilt, trials
often tend to absolve other states, corporations, groups, institutions,
215 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, ‘The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law’ (1998), 96Michigan Law
Review 1621, 1641; R.A. Duff, ‘Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of
Punishment’ (1996), 20 Crime and Justice 1, 8; Jean Hampton, ‘An Expressive Theory of
Retribution’, in Wesley Cragg (ed), Retributivism and Its Critics (Berlin: Franz Steiner Verlag,
1992) pp. 1, 32–3.
216 See Christoph Schreuer, ‘Regionalism v. Universalism’ (1995), 6 European Journal of
International Law, 477.
217 See generally Laurence Helfer & Karen J. Alter, ‘Legitimacy & Lawmaking: A Tale of Three
International Courts’ (2013), 14 Theoretical Inquiry in Law 479, 502.
218 See M. V.S. Sirleaf, ‘Beyond Truth & Punishment in Transitional Justice’ (2014), 54 Virginia
Journal of International Law [hereinafter Sirleaf, Beyond Truth & Punishment] (internal
citations omitted).
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bystanders, and the rest of society of any responsibility as if individuals
committed massive violations in a vacuum.219 The focus on establishing
individual accountability for a small number of crimes may present the
opportunity for many criminal participants including corporations ‘to ration-
alize or deny their own responsibility for crimes,’220 which limits the ability of
such trials to express social solidarity and condemnation. The Court’s ability
to prosecute trafﬁcking in hazardous waste and the provision for corporate
criminal liability may advance the already limited ability of such trials to
express social solidarity and condemnation, and thereby increase the cred-
ibility of such trials, even if minimally. This improvement while not elimin-
ating some of the problematic tendencies of such trials, would be a welcome
development. The regional criminal court in Africa could develop a regional
jurisprudence221 on trafﬁcking in hazardous waste given the prevalence of
these issues in Africa,222 which may inﬂuence other jurisdictions to express
condemnation of this crime. In sum, the regional prosecution of trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste may further expressive condemnation goals. Accordingly,
Art. 28L of the Malabo Protocol would assist with advancing the Bamako
Convention’s objectives of punishment for trafﬁckers of hazardous waste
through expressive condemnation.
C. Regional Criminalization of Trafﬁcking in Hazardous
Waste and Deterrence
The prosecution of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste through the Court could
also help to further deterrence. Utilitarian theories focus on punishment as a
means to achieve some desired end, usually the prevention of future crimes.223
Deterrence theories of punishment are based on the rationale that potential
perpetrators are dissuaded from committing atrocities due to the risk and fear
219 See id.
220 Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’ (2002), 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573, 601.
221 For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed a rich jurisprudence
on the ‘right to truth’ and forced disappearances due to the prevalence of authoritarian regimes
in the region. See the Preamble of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances
of Persons, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Belem do Para, 8 June 1994, in
force 28 March 1996 available at www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/disappearance.asp
222 See Section 2B.
223 See generally J. Bentham, ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’,
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1988); H.L.A. Hart, ‘Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the
Philosophy of Law’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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of punishment.224 Individual or speciﬁc deterrence seeks to prevent future
crime by setting sentences that are strict enough to ensure that a particular
offender will not reoffend. While general deterrence attempts to prevent crime
by inducing others who might be tempted to commit crime, to desist out of
fear of the penalty.
The ability of the Court to contribute towards deterrence goals may simi-
larly be limited because it is dependent on member states for cooperation.225
In order for deterrence theory to work as applied to the crime of trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste – the risk of getting caught and being punished cannot be so
low as to be discounted. Yet, the regional Court is dependent on state parties
to effectively carry out any investigation and prosecution of trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste for everything from the identiﬁcation and location of persons,
to the arrest, detention, and transfer of persons to the Court, as well as the
freezing and seizure of assets for forfeiture.226 The Court may face signiﬁcant
challenges with trying to increase the likelihood of getting caught for trafﬁck-
ing in hazardous waste. As noted above the illegal trafﬁcking in hazardous
waste depends on an underground economy,227 which may be exceedingly
difﬁcult to investigate, and prosecute. The regional criminal court’s inability
to prosecute the trafﬁcking in hazardous waste effectively could be even more
pronounced because many of the individuals or entities sought will likely be
located outside of the Continent, and those located within Africa may not be
parties to the Malabo regime. The problem of under-detection was illustrated
in the toxic waste scandal in Nigeria. It highlights how detection of the crime
of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste is likely to prove difﬁcult. As a result, there is
a signiﬁcant risk that hazardous, even radioactive materials, could be trans-
ported and left in Africa undetected until residents begin to suffer severe
negative health consequences. Moreover, the domestic prosecution of the
U.S. ‘war on drugs’ demonstrates that unless changes are made on the demand
side, cracking down on the suppliers will only lead to more individuals and
entities stepping in to ﬁll the roles of those imprisoned. Furthermore, at the
international level where crimes of mass atrocity are committed more openly,
prosecutions have been anything, but swift or certain, and this is with more
224 See, e.g., Deirdre Golash, ‘The Justiﬁcation of Punishment in the International Context’, in
Larry May & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), ‘International Criminal Law and Philosophy’
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp. 201, 211 (Immi Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility
and Sense of International Criminal Law’ (2002), 13 European Journal of International Law
561.
225 See art. 46L of the Malabo Protocol.
226 See id.
227 See Section 2 for further discussion.
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states participating in the Rome Statute regime.228 Accordingly, it may be
worthwhile to consider supplementary monitoring mechanisms that will help
ensure that, if proscribed conduct is violated, the Prosecutor for the regional
court will come to learn of these violations.
On the other hand, the Court might be able to contribute to deterrence in
other ways. For example, the penalties would have to be adequately publi-
cized regionally to further deterrence. The Malabo Protocol provides that
‘penalties shall be pronounced in public.’229 The Court should make every
effort to publicize its sanctions not just before the accused or by word of
mouth, but in print, online, and on social media. Moreover, the Court may
further deterrence due to the severity of its penalties and sentences for
trafﬁcking in hazardous waste. It remains to be seen how the Court will
determine its sentences or penalties for those found guilty of trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste and whether it will have any impact on marginal deter-
rence. Because the Court has a lot of latitude under the Protocol to impose
penalties and sentences (short of the death penalty),230 signiﬁcant penalties
and sentences should be imposed in order to further the goals of speciﬁc and
general deterrence.
Additionally, some commentators have found that deterrence due to the
fear of trials may be more inﬂuential for higher-level perpetrators, while
deterrence due to the fear of penalties might be more impactful for lower-
level perpetrators.231 It is not evident whether the unlikely, but more severe
punishment of imprisonment or the more likely, but less severe sanction of a
ﬁne will deter would-be trafﬁckers in hazardous waste. The Malabo Protocol
gives the Court the ﬂexibility of taking individual circumstances into account
when imposing sentences or penalties.232 This adaptability will be incredibly
important for dealing with hazardous waste brokers, as the penalties or
sentences imposed on these intermediaries may need to differ from those
imposed on those lower or higher-up the ‘food-chain.’ Unlike retributive
justice, deterrence theory does not require the punishment of all equally
culpable individuals. Accordingly, the Court’s inability to prosecute political
228 There are 123 countries that are State parties to the Rome Statute; African States form the
biggest regional block, with thirty-four state parties. See International Criminal Court, The
State Parties to the Rome Statute www.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%
20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last checked on Oct. 24, 2017).
229 See art. 43A(3) of the Malabo Protocol.
230 See arts. 43A(1) and (2) of the Malabo Protocol.
231 See Miriam Aukerman, ‘Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding
Transitional Justice’ (2002), 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 39, 70.
232 See art. 43A(4) Malabo Protocol.
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leaders that are alleged to have engaged in trafﬁcking of hazardous waste due
to the immunity provision, is not fatal from a deterrence perspective. This is
because, if exemplary punishments adequately deter future crime that is
sufﬁcient. As such, the selective prosecution of ‘intermediaries’ or lower-
level perpetrators may sufﬁce to further general deterrence goals. The
regional Court could focus its prosecutions on private local companies,
individuals, lower-level government ofﬁcials, as well as waste brokers. This
prosecution strategy may be useful because it will be difﬁcult for the Court to
obtain jurisdiction over higher-level perpetrators, or individuals and entities
outside the Continent. Yet, as the Court grows and begins to increase its
credibility, prosecutions of those higher up the food chain could be done
more fruitfully.
The Court may also further deterrence because this theory of punishment
depends on the perpetrator being a ‘rational actor’. The individual(s) con-
templating engaging in trafﬁcking must be deterrable and trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste is a crime that requires careful planning as opposed to
being a crime of hate or passion. Consequently, deterrence theory is
expected to work as applied to trafﬁcking in hazardous waste because actors
engaging in it are more likely to do a cost-beneﬁt analysis. Indeed, the
combination of cheap land and labour for landﬁll operations, concomitant
with looser regulations and enforcement mechanisms in developing coun-
tries, means that exporting hazardous waste is a cost-effective option for
producers in the Global North, and offers short-term beneﬁts to importers
in the Global South.233 The Malabo Protocol seeks to disrupt this calculus
from the reported ‘$2.50 per ton to dump hazardous waste in Africa as
opposed to $250 per ton in Europe.’234
In addition, actors may not engage in toxic dumping for extra-legal reasons.
For example, lower-level perpetrators might simply believe that trafﬁcking in
hazardous waste is wrong, or higher-level perpetrators may be more concerned
about political isolation regionally or internationally for engaging in trafﬁck-
ing in hazardous waste. For these individuals, the Court’s intervention would
be expected to have no impact on deterrence. Yet, the net result of these extra-
legal deterrents would be to reduce the amount of trafﬁcking in hazardous
waste. Even if it does so minimally, the Court will further deterrence goals by
raising the cost of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste in Africa – by increasing the
regulation and prosecution of this crime, or at least increasing the stigma
associated with the crime. In sum, Article 28L of the Malabo Protocol will
233 See Pratt ‘Decreasing Dirty Dumping?’ p. 154.
234 UNEP Report.
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assist with fulﬁlling the Bamako Convention’s requirement that criminal
penalties ‘be sufﬁciently high to both punish and deter’ trafﬁcking in hazard-
ous waste.235
5. conclusion
Given the analysis above, there are many reasons to be cautiously optimistic
about Article 28L’s criminalization of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste and the
provision of a regional forum for investigation and prosecution for this crime
and others under the Malabo Protocol. While it is unlikely that the regional
criminalization of trafﬁcking in hazardous waste will contribute to retribution,
there are many theories of punishment that support the Protocol’s innovation
in this area, including restorative justice, expressive condemnation, and deter-
rence. It is also important to bear in mind that the proposed Court would be
one tool amongst many for combating the trafﬁcking in hazardous waste.
While by no means perfect, the Malabo Protocol presents another option for
African states whose domestic judiciaries and related institutions may not be
able to prosecute trafﬁcking in hazardous waste at all. Additionally, Article 28L
of the Protocol certainly helps to fulﬁl many criminal justice goals of the
Bamako Convention when compared to the international system, which has
failed to prosecute trafﬁcking in hazardous waste or corporations involved in
dirty dumping.
235 Art. 9(2) of the Bamako Convention.
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